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The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE*
INTRODUCTION
A quarter century ago, in a proyocative and prophetic article, David E. Feller
lamented the imminent close of what he described as labor arbitration's "golden
age."' I have expressed reservations about that characterization, insofar as it
suggested an impending shrinkage in the stature of arbitration.2 But Professor Feller
was right on target in one important respect. Labor arbitration was going to change
dramatically from the autonomous institution in the relatively self-contained world
of union-management relations which it had been from the end of World War II into
the 1970s.
When the subject matter was largely confined to union-employer agreements,
arbitration could fairly be considered "part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process itself,"3 and the courts were more than happy to keep hands off. When unions
and employers began to make federal and state statutes part of the agenda of
arbitration, however, as happened increasingly in the 1970s, it became an entirely
different story. Statutory interpretation is the special province of the courts. They are
not going to let some private arbitrator get away unchallenged with palpable
misreadings of the legislative text.' Academics like me may think a sound argument
can be made that, at least as between the initial contracting parties, arbitrators' honest
mistakes of law should still receive deference in the courts much like the deference
accorded their honest mistakes of fact.5 Yet even the proponents of this view would
not allow an arbitrator to mangle an individual employee's right against race or sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 Closer
judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards involving statutory claims was inevitable.
So, the first great change in the role of arbitration was its extension into the
statutory domain in the collective bargaining context Perhaps not coincidentally, the
courts about this time became more and more willing to test traditional contract
awards against the vaguer standard of "public policy."7 Then, beginning mostly
in the 1980s and accelerating sharply in the 1990s, came another major
* James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
1. David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in
ARBITRATIoN-I 976, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE29TH ANNUALMEETINGNATIONALACADEMYOF
ARBITRATORS 97 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald D. Somers eds., 1976).
2. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review ofLaborArbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1161 (1977).
3. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,'578 (1960).
4. See Feller, supra note 1, at 121-26.
5. While the decisions are divided, there is clear authority that arbitrators may be made
the final judges of law as well as fact, and awards issued under misconceptions of the law will
be upheld. M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Right of Arbitrator to Consider or to Base His
Decision upon Matters Other than Those Involved in the Legal Principles Applicable to the
Questions at Issue Between the Parties, 112 A.L.R- 873, 878-88 (1938).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
7. See infra Part II.
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development-arbitration systems established unilaterally by nonunion employers.'
These systems were sometimes designed to divert from the courts employee claims
of "wrongful discharge" under several modifications in the traditional American
doctrine ofemployment at will.9 Even more eagerlypromotedby employers, however,
was the use of arbitration to keep statutory discrimination claims away from civil
tribunals and especially juries. This Article will treat the legal and policy implications
of these various procedures and standards for dispute resolution. I shall deal briefly
in turn with (1) mandatory arbitration of statutory rights, (2) judicial review of
arbitration awards on public-policy grounds, and (3) arbitration of claims" that there
was not "good cause" for employee discharges.
I. MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
As already indicated, the arbitration of an alleged violation of an employee's
statutory rights may arise in two quite different settings. First, the employee may be
covered by a collective agreement that, as is customary, requires "just cause" or
"good cause" for any dismissal. All disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the contract are subject to arbitration. A fired worker insists the real
reason for the termination was race, sex, or age discrimination, and the union takes
the case to arbitration. The arbitrator concludes the employee was guilty of excessive
absenteeism, finds no discrimination, and denies the grievance. The employee then
proceeds to file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") ° and subsequently brings an action in federal court. Naturally, the
employer cries foul: "You're trying to take two bites at the apple," it says. "The
arbitrator's award is resjudicata," and so on.
In the second situation, there is no union. Individual employees apply for ajob and
are presented with a form to sign. It obligates employees to submit all workplace
disputes to an arbitration system devised by the employer rather than to take them to
court. If any applicants have the foresight and temerity to ask whether this
arrangement covers statutory claims and whether they must sign if they want the job,
they are told the answer is "Yes" to both questions. Later, an employee hired under
these conditions is dismissed and alleges discrimination. Despite having signed the
employer's required form, the dischargee files a federal court action after having gone
through the necessary EEOC procedure. This employer, too, needless to say,
interposes the arbitration agreement as a bar to the suit.
Twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court appeared to lay to rest any idea that
8. See generally CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. & JOEL M. GROssMAN, THE MODERN LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 266-78 (Supp. 1992); WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J.
LEECH, EMPLOYMENTTERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993); HENRYH. PERRITT,
JR., EMPLOYEE DISMIssAL LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1998).
9. See, e.g.,TheodoreJ. St. AntoineA Seed Germinates: UnjustDischargeReformfHeads
Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56, 59-60 (1988); Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as
the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7, 12-14, 18 (1988). See
generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development ofthe Employment at WillRule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 118 (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
[Vol. 76:83
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private arbitration could displace an employee's resort to statutory procedures. In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.," the Court held an arbitrator's adverse decision
under a collective bargaining agreement did not prevent a black employee from
pursuing in court a claim that his discharge was based on racial discrimination in
violation of Title VII. 2 The Supreme Court reasoned that the arbitrator was only
authorized to decide the contractual issue of discrimination and not the statutory
issue. 3 Apparently the Court was untroubled that the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or"Board") routinely"defers" to arbitrators' rulings regarding employees'
rights under the National Labor Relations Act. 4 Maybe the real reason for the result
in Gardner-Denver was skepticism about union zeal, at least as of the early 1970s,
in pressing Title VII discrimination cases in contrast to -cases of anti-union
discrimination.
A decade ago the Supreme Court seemed to take an abrupt turn away from the
Gardner-Denver approach. In Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,'s it held that
an individual stockbroker employee was bound by a contract with the New York
Stock Exchange to arbitrate a claim of age discrimination against his employer. 6 The
Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on the grounds that in Gilmer the arbitrator was
authorized to handle statutory as well as contractual disputes. 7 The earlier case was
also said to involve a "tension" between union representation and individual statutory
rights. 8 Furthermore, the Court stressed that no loss of statutory rights occurred in
Gilmer.9 It was only a change of forum.'
Gilmer could easily havebeen decided on such old-fashioned grounds as the failure
of the plaintiff to exhaust internal remedies. There, unlike Gardner-Denver, no
arbitration proceedings had as yet been conducted.2" That makes all the more
significant the Court's readiness to go out of its way to endorse arbitration as a final
dispute-resolution mechanism, even when made a condition of employment. Despite
this, the Court noted that the stockbroker was not precluded from filing a charge with
the EEOC;' it was only his court action that was barred.'
11. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
12. Id. at 59-60; see also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981)
(finding employees not barred by arbitration award on wage claim under union contract from
suing under Fair Labor Standards Act). In Gardner-Denver, the Court noted that the
arbitrator's award could be admitted into evidence in subsequent court proceedings, and, if
certain procedural safeguards were observed, it could be accorded "great weight." Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
13. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-57.
14. See, e.g., Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955); Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 573,573-77 (1984).
15. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
16. Id. at23.
17. Id. at 35.
18. Id.
19. Id. at34.
20. Id. at 26.
21. See id. at 24.
22. Id. at 28. The courts of appeals are divided on whether the EEOC can seek both
equitable and monetary relief in the face of an individual's mandatory arbitration agreement
or whether it is limited to an equitable remedy to vindicate public policy. Compare EEOC v.
2001]
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Gardner-Denver and Gilmer can be distinguished in several ways, some more
plausible than others. The Court's own emphasis on the authority of the arbitrator will
make little difference, if unions and employers can simply empower arbitrators in the
labor contract to deal with statutory issues. More recently, however, in Wright v.
UniversalMaritime Service Corp.,24 the Court held that any union-negotiated waiver
of an employee's statutory right to a judicial forum must be "clear and
unmistakable."' On the existence of a real distinction between Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer, the explanation of Judge Harry Edwards in Cole v. Burns International
Security Services 6 is more convincing than the Court's. Speaking for the District of
Columbia Circuit, he emphasized that in individual contracts of employment, the
employee maintains control over the arbitration presentation, while the union is in
control in the collective bargaining setting. 7
On the other hand, in terms of bargaining power, one might argue that a union's
agreement to arbitrate and waive the judicial forum should be more acceptable-less
of a contract of adhesion-than an isolated individual employee's agreement.
Moreover, any concern that a labor organization might treat an employee's civil rights
cavalierly should be tempered by the existence of the well-established union duty of
fair representation.2 8 Significantly, the Supreme Court in Wright recognized, but did
not resolve, the question of whether "Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute
prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer."
Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (both remedies available), with
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999) (no monetary award allowed), and
EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (arbitration agreement
precludes monetary damages). Cf Merrill Lynch, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding state agency immune under Eleventh Amendment from employer's action to enjoin
the agency from proceeding with employee's discrimination claims against employer after
alleged victim had pursued claims through arbitration).
23. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
24. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
25. Id. at 80.
26. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
27. Id. at 1475-77. In Wright, Justice Scalia for the Court distinguished between "an
individual's waiver of his own rights [Gilmer], rather than a union's waiver of the rights of
represented employees [Gardner-Denver]." Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-81.
28. See, e.g., Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969)
(recognizing that petitioners who had alleged collusion between their union and employer to
deny them civil rights need not exhaust their remedies under a collective bargaining agreement
in order to maintain an action, as one lies in breach of duty of fair representation); Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17-19 (5th Cir. 1966). Applying modem "public choice" theory
concerning the political power of cohesive minority groups within any organization, one
scholar has predicted that unions would not agree to arbitrate statutory claims if such groups
believed arbitration was not in their best interest. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to the (Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
in the Wake ofGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., BYU L. REv. 591, 605 (1997).
29. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80. For recent analyses from an academic and a union perspective,
respectively, see Stuart L. Bass, What the Courts Say About Mandatory Arbitration, DISP.
REsOL J., Nov. 1999, at 24; Leonard D. Polletta, What's Left After Wright?, DiSP. RESOL J.,
[Vol. 76:83
HeinOnline  -- 76 Ind. L.J. 86 2001
LABOR ARBITRATION
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (" 1991 Act") contains some
strong language indicating that arbitration should not displace Title VII processes, the
subject of Gardner-Denver." The ADEA, involved in Gilmer, expressly permits
waivers under certain prescribed conditions." It has also been suggested that Title
VII's protections against discrimi 'ation because of race, sex, religion, and natural
origin implicate more sensitive rights than the right against discrimination because
of age, which was at issue in Gilmer.32 Finally, it can be argued that job applicants
like Gilmer have less of an equity in their jobs than an incumbent employee such as
Alexander may have been in Gardner-Denver.
The distinction that has stood up in the eyes of most courts is between a collective
bargaining agreement (Gardner-Denver) and an individual contract of employment
(Gilmer). The courts of appeals have generally sustained individual agreements to
arbitrate as barring court suits,33 but have rejected employers' objections to court
Nov. 1999, at48.
30. Although section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1081 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)), "encouraged" the use of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law," the House report emphasized that ADR procedures were only intended to "supplement"
and not "supplant" Title VII rights and remedies. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 97 (1991).
Two leading legislators limited or disavowed Gilmer. See 137 CONG. REc. 29,040 (1991)
(statement of Sen. Dole) ("This provision encourages the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including binding arbitration, where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to
use those [alternative] methods.") (emphasis added); id. at 30,665 (statement ofRep. Edwards)
(,"No approval whatsoever is intended of... [Gilmer] v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp.'); cf
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1194-97 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the 1991 Act precludes compulsory arbitration ofTitle VII claims). But, most courts ofappeals
have held the 1991 Act does not prevent the enforcement ofcompulsory arbitration agreements.
E.g., Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999); Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, 170 F.3d 1 (lstCir. 1999); Koveleskiev. SBC Capital
Mkts., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 44 (1999); Seus v. John Nuveen
& Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d
875 (4th Cir. 1996).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 626(t) (1994) (waiver must be "knowing and voluntary").
32. Age is not a "suspect" classification. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,312-
14(1976).
33. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 4 (refusing to enforce arbitration on facts of case);
Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 368 (consentingto arbitration waives right to an Article III forum, thus
no right exists to ajurytrial outside offorum); Seus, 146 F.3d at 185-87 (upholding contractual
agreement to arbitrate employment claims); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d
1054, 1057-58 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause since damages not
allowed for Title VII claims); Patterso? v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that Title VII claims are subject to individual consensual agreements to
arbitrate); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding
unanimously that due-process standards would have to be observed and in a two-to-one
decision that the employer would have to pay all the arbitrator's fees); Rojas v. TK
Communications, 87 F.3d 745,747 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a contract to settle disputes
arising out of such contract is valid); Metz v. Merill Lynch, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482,1487 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding that Title VII claims are subject to compulsory arbitration); Willis v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that arbitration agreement
2001]
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actions because of an arbitration clause in a union contract.34 Only the Fourth Circuit,
in a two-to-one decision, concluded that Gilmer had superseded Gardner-Denver
even as to collective bargaining agreements.35 And the Fourth Circuit holding could
also be explained on an exhaustion-of-remedies theory; there had been no recourse
to the arbitration procedure provided by the union contract prior to the court suit.
3 6
Perhaps a crucial question in the collective bargaining context should be whether the
union has agreed actually to waive employees' rights to a statutory forum or instead
to add a contractual clair.
Two federal agencies and a couple of private bodies have weighed in against
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment claims. In a July 1995 policy
statement, the EEOC declared: "[P]arties must knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily
enter into an ADR proceeding."'37 But Gilmer can be regarded at best as involving a
"knowing" agreement on the employee's part. It was hardly "voluntary" in the EEOC
sense of the word. The general counsel of the NLRB seemed ready at one point to
issue unfair labor practice complaints against any effort to impose mandatory
arbitration agreements, but later that was apparently limited to attempts to prevent the
filing of charges with the NLRB."
The December 1994 Report of the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations ("Commission") stated: "[A]ny choice between available
methods for enforcing statutory employment rights should be left to the individual
who feels wronged rather than dictated by his or her employment contract."39 But the
Commission hinted at the possibility of more flexibility by suggesting that the issue
be revisited after there was more experience with the arbitration of statutory claims.4"
Finally, the Naional Academy of Arbitrators ("Academy") at its May 1997 meeting
expressed its opposition to "mandatory employment arbitration as a condition of
employment when it requires waiver of direct access to either a judicial or
in a securities registration application was enforceable under Title VII). Contra Duffield, 144
F.3d at 1199 (concluding that the 1991 Act precludes individual waiver of right to sue under
Title VII). For a recent overview of the cases, see Charles J. Coleman, Mandatory Arbitration
of Statutory Issues: Austin, Wright, and the Future, in ARBITRATION 1998: THE CHANGING
WORLD OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5 1ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 134 (Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig eds., 1999).
34. See, e.g., Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526-27 (11 th Cir.
1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997); Vamer v. Nat'l Super
Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996).
35. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880 (4th Cir.
1996).
36. Id. at 879.
37. EEOC: Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 405:7301,
405:7302 (July 17, 1995). In July 1997 the EEOC issued a longer and even stronger
condemnation of compulsory arbitration or predispute agreements to arbitrate; declaring that
"even the best arbitral systems do not afford the benefits of the judicial system." EEOC:
MandatoryArbitration ofEmployment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition ofEmployment,
8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7511,405:7520 (1997).
38. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
39. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OFWORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF COMMERCE
& LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (Dec. 1994).
40. Id.
[Vol. 76:83
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administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights."" But the Academy added
that, given the present state of the law, its members could serve as arbitrators in such
cases.42 Members nonetheless were advised to observe certain guidelines as to the
fairness of these procedures. 3 A broadly constituted task force sponsored by the
American Bar Association ("ABA") took no position in a May 1995 protocol
concerningthe timing (predispute orpostdispute) of arbitration agreements-and thus
effectively their "voluntariness"--but it did agree they should be "knowingly
made.""
There has been a reasonable degree of consensus on the procedural requirements
for a fair arbitration, whether voluntary or mandatory. Thus both the Dunlop
Commission report and the due-process protocol of the ABA Task Force came up
with very similar sets of procedural guarantees. They included
1. a jointly selected neutral arbitrator who knows the law;
2. simple, adequate discovery;
3. cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator neutrality;4"
41. Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators, Statement of the National Academy of Arbitrators on
Condition of Employment Agreements, in ARBITRATION 1997: T1E NEXT FIFTY YEARS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 50TH ANNUAL MEETING app. at 312 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment,A DueProcessProtocol
for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment
Relationship, 50 Disp. RESOL J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37-38. The task force consisted of
management, union, and plaintiffs' attorneys from the ABA and the National Employment
Lawyers Association, and representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National
Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. Id. at 39.
45. In Cole, the court required the employer to pay all the arbitrator's fees as a condition
for enforcing the employee's waiver of a judicial forum. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-85 (2-1
decision). Surely Judge Edwards, speaking for the majority, was right that the source of
payment is not the key to arbitrator neutrality. Id. at 1485. Arbitrators are naturally concerned
about getting their fee, but ordinarily not about where it comes from. Individual employees, of
course, may feel more comfortable paying part of the arbitrator's fee, being unable to accept
the notion there is no connection between the source of payment and a potential bias on the
part of the decisionmaker.
The more sensitive problem, at least as a matter of appearances, is who chooses the
arbitrator. Employers are far more likely to be "repeat players" in arbitration than employees.
Thus, an arbitrator's continuing acceptability probably turns more on employer than employee
attitudes. This is not a matter on which the source of payment is going to have much effect.
One has to count primarily on the inherent integrity of the great body of arbitrators-and on
their knowledge that recognition of that integrity in the labor-management community is
indispensable for their capacity to practice.
Cole may have gone too far in insisting that the employer pay all the arbitrator's fee. Access
lo a court, at least initially, would ordinarily not be cost-free. Some modest but reasonable (a
maximum of one week's pay?) sharing of the arbitrator's charges may serve as a realistic
deterrent to an employee's filing of frivolous claims. If the employee ultimately prevails, then
the arbitrator, like a court, could apportion fees and costs accordingly.
2001]
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4. representation by a person of the employee's choice;
5. remedies equal to those provided by the law;
6. a written opinion and award, with reasons; and
7. limited judicial review, concentrating on the law.'
At least three distinguished federal appellate judges have publicly extolled the
advantages of arbitration over litigation in vindicating statutory rights against
discrimination. These were Judges Harry Edwards of the District of Columbia
Circuit, Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit, and Alvin Rubin of the Fifth Circuit.47
They stressed arbitration's merits of speed, cost savings, and relative informality.
None of these endorsements dealt with mandatory arbitration. But at least they should
dispose of concerns about the competency of trained arbitrators to handle the usual
statutory interpretive problems in a discrimination case.
As a matter of policy, the arguments against mandatory arbitration are plain and
powerful. Congress (or a state legislature) has established certain statutory rights for
individual employees and has provided the procedures for their enforcement. No
union should be able to trade away either the substantive or the procedural statutory
rights of the workers it represents. No individual employee should be forced to
choose between those rights and getting or keeping ajob. The procedure or forum for
redress may be almost as important in many instances as the substantive right itself.
The goal of the law should not be thwarted directly or indirectly. Any predispute
agreement to arbitrate is by definition not trulyvoluntary. Employees' whole concern
at such times is being hired or pleasing the boss, and they do not appreciate what
might be at stake in the future. That is not a free and knowing choice.
All these arguments against waiver are especially strong when the right in question
is as sensitive as protection against discrimination because of race, sex, religion, age,
disability, or the like. Permitting employers to condition employment on an
employee's agreement to arbitrate rather than litigate workplace claims, including
statutory rights against discrimination, seems a blatant affront to a major public
policy. As might be expected, numerous scholars and public and private bodies have
46. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF
COMMERCE & LABOR, supra note 39, at 30-32; Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Employment, supra note 44, at 38-39. The Fourth Circuit, ordinarily most receptive to
arbitration in place of court litigation, nonetheless refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate
a claim of sexual harassment when the employer's unilaterally established procedures were "so
one-sided that their only possible purpose [must have been] to undermine the neutrality of the
proceeding." Hooters of Ami., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).
47. See Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation: Reflections of a
Judge, in ARBrrRATION 1982, CONDUCT OF THE HEARING: PROCEEDINGS OFTHE35THANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 16, 27-28 (James L. Stem & Barbara D.
Dennis eds., 1983); Betty Binns Fletcher, Arbitration of Title VII Claims: Some Judicial
Perceptions, in ARBrrRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980S, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34TH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 218, 228 (James L. Stem & Barbara D.
Dennis eds., 1982); Alvin B. Rubin, Arbitration: Toward a Rebirth, in TRUTH, LIEDETECTORS,
AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN LABOR ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE3 1STANNUALMEETING
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 30, 36 (James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds.,
1979).
[Vol. 76:83
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condemned the use of mandatory arbitration on just such grounds." A forceful
additional argument is that a few well-publicized pocketbook-jarring jury verdicts
might do far more to promote the public policy of deterrence and hasten the end of
workplace discrimination than. any number of privately issued and modest arbitral
awards.
49
Private arbitrators are not publicly accountable. Many of them are not all that
knowledgeable about public law. And the rerouting of substantial numbers of civil
rights cases from the courts to arbitration, with the consequent loss of a continuing
stream of published court decisions, could have an unhealthy impact on the
development of the law itself °
Yet there is another side to the story. It is counterintuitive and highly pragmatic. It
reflects a willingness to take the professional or midlevel-management employee's
opportunity to get before ajury with a rare seven, or high-six, figure claim, and trade
it for the only realistic opportunity that most lower-level workers will have to recover
a job and a small financial award. Experienced plaintiffs' attorneys have estimated
that only about five percent of the individuals with an employment claim who seek
help from the private bar are able to obtain counsel."1 One of the Detroit area's top
employment specialists was more precise in a conversation with me. His secretary
kept an actual count; he took on only one out of eighty-seven persons who contacted
him for possible representation. Now, many of those who are rejected will not have
meritorious claims. But others will be workers whose potential dollar recovery will
simply. not justify the investment of the time and money of a first-rate lawyer in
preparing a court action. For those individuals, the cheaper, simpler process of
arbitration is the most feasible recourse. It will cost a lawyer far less time and effort
to take a case to arbitration; at worst, claimants can represent themselves or be
represented by laypersons in this much less formal and intimidating forum.
Ideally, an employee would be offered the choice of arbitration after a dispute has
arisen, not at some previous point in the employment relationship. If an employee has
been discharged, for example, there is nothing much to lose by refusing to arbitrate,
and thus any agreement is much likelier to be voluntary in the fullest sense. But there
was credible testimony by management representatives before the Dunlop
Commission that employers would generally not be willing to enter into postdispute
48. See, e.g., David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between
Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561 (1997); Joseph R. Grodin,Arbitration ofEmployment
Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 1
(1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, MandatoryArbitration ofIndividualEmploymentRights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER U. L. REv. 1017 (1996); see also supra
notes 37, 39-44 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 381,429-31 (1996).
50. Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 293,297 (1999).
51. Lewis L. Maltby, PrivateJustice: EmploymentArbitration and CivilRights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 58 (1998); cf. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer
Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
399,418-62 (2000).
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agreements to arbitrate.52 For most run-of-the-mill claims, employers will be inclined
to wait them out, assuming that the greatbulk will go nowhere. Workers will not have
the gumption to pursue lesser claims, and they probably will not find lawyers to take
their cases if they try.
For employers, the desired trade-off is the one big case against the many smaller
ones. Even if successful, a defense before ajury may cost $100,000 to $200,000 or
wore. And a professional arbitrator will be less disposed than an emotionally aroused
jury to hand out seven-figure awards. But, conversely, few employees and their
lawyers will be willing to arbitrate the big case rather than take it to a jury. Thus for
management the sensible strategy is to agree to arbitrate only if everything can be
included, and that almost necessarily means an agreement before any dispute arises.
If employers are not bluffing, therefore, the only choice for the ordinary worker with
an ordinary claim may be apre-dispute agreement to arbitrate--or nothing.
The EEOC will not be the salvation of the employee with a minimal case. Before
a severely overburdened and underfunded EEOC resorted to its "triage" procedure
a few years ago-classifying cases as A, B, or C priorities depending on merit and
importance, and tossing out many charges after the briefest of investigations-its
backlog had soared past 100,000 charges and it was receiving almost 100,000 new
charges a year.53 The situation was so bleak that one knowledgeable scholar
recommended, quite understandably, that the EEOC get out of the business of
handling individual charges and husband its limited resources for routing out
systemic unlawful practices.'
Even if individual claimants can get to court, mounting empirical evidence
indicates most of them will fare less well there than they would before a qualified
arbitrator. Several studies show that employees actually win more often in arbitration
than in court and, while a successful plaintiff recovers more from a judge and a jury,
claimants as a group get more from arbitrators." That was true before the due-process
protocol was adopted, and should be even truer with the protocol in effect.
Most court dockets are heavily backlogged and delay is endemic. That can be
devastating for the fired worker without a job or with a much-reduced income. A
considerably more conservative judiciary than existed in earlier years may be all too
willing to grant summary judgment against those civil-rights plaintiffs who do
manage to file suit. Traditional labor arbitrators have had to remain mutually
acceptable to unions and employers, and the same is likely to become true for
arbitrators in the new employer/individual-employee field as an increasingly savvy
52. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF
COMMERCE & LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT 118 (1994); see also Task Force on Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Employment, supra note 44, at 37.
53. National Enforcement Plan Tops EEOCAgenda, 151 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 129 (Feb.
5, 1996), available at WL 151 LRR 129 d20; EEOCAdopts Change-Priority System, 149 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) I (May 1, 1995), available at WL 149 LRR 1 d19.
54. Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 219, 219 (1995).
55. Maltby, supra note 51, at 54. In a study by the American Arbitration Association,
arbitral claimants prevailed sixty-three percent of the time. By contrast, plaintiffs' success rates
in separate surveys of federal court and EEOC cases were only 14.9% and 16.8%, respectively.
Id. at 46, 49.
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plaintiffs' bar develops. There is no comparable check on the lifetime appointees to
the federal bench or, as a practical matter, on longtime incumbents of state courts.
In view of the accumulating data about the actual experience of discrimination
victims, we would be mistaken in condemning mandatory arbitration out of hand. It
may'well be the most realistic hope of the ordinary blue- or pink-collar claimant.'
That assumes, I should emphasize, that the necessary due-process safeguards exist,
of the sort specified by the Dunlop Commission and the ABA protocol.' Those
would include a knowledgeable, truly neutral arbitrator in whose selection the
employee has participated, with the power to provide any remedies authorized by the
statute. Absent a surprising turnabout from the Supreme Court's stance in Gilmer, the
handling of statutory discrimination charges will be a continuing challenge for the
country's arbitrators in the years ahead. 8
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY
In the famous Steelworkers Trilogy,59 the Supreme Court made arbitration the
linchpin in the federal scheme for the implementation of collective bargaining
agreements. More specifically for our purposes, the Court in one of the three cases,
UnitedSteelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,60 imposed tight constraints on
judicial review of arbitral awards." So long as the award is not the product of fraud
or corruption, does not exceed the arbitrator's authority under the parties' submission,
and "draws its essence" from the labor contract, a court is to enforce the award
without any attempt to "review the merits."'62 Despite these strictures, the itch of the
judiciary to right seeming wrongs has compelled the Court to revisit the subject, most
notably in United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc. 3
56. The National Association of Securities' Dealers Office of Dispute Resolution, which
administers over 5000 arbitrations a year, recently reported that an independent survey by two
college professors indicated that about ninety-three percent of the participants who answered
a questionnaire (fifty-four percent were claimants) concluded their cases were handled "fairly
and witho ut bias." NASD Arbitration Forum Overwhelmingly Praisedfor Fairness According
to Independent Survey, PR NEwswIR, Aug. 5, 1999, LEXIS, Markets and Industry Library,
IACNWS File. Although the securities industry system has been much criticized for lack of
impartiality, a U.S. General Accounting Office study found that employees using it won fifty-
five percent of the time. Maltby, supra note 51, at 50.
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58. For more recent and more sympathetic treatments ofmandatory arbitration, see Richard
A. Bales, Creating and Challenging Compulsory Arbitration Agreements, 13 LAB. LAW. 511
(1998); Samuel EstreicherPre-DisputeAgreementstoArbitrateStatutoyEmployment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1997); Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 221 (1997).
59. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
60. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
61. Id. at 597-98.
62. Id. at596-99. Butthe arbitratormustnot"dispensehis own brand ofindustrialjustice."
Id. at 597.
63. 484 U.S. 29 (1987)..
20011
HeinOnline  -- 76 Ind. L.J. 93 2001
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
Misco dealt with the hottest current issue concerningjudicial review, namely, when
a court should set aside an arbitral award on the grounds that it violates public policy.
The Fifth Circuit had refused to enforce an arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee
whosejob was to operate a dangerous paper-cuttingmachine, and whose car hadbeen
found to contain marijuana while in the company parking lot.' The Supreme Court
reversed, declaring that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." 65 The
Court naturally recognized the general common-law doctrine that no contract in
contravention of law or public policy will be enforced.' But it cautioned,
a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of [labor] contracts is
limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate "some
explicit public policy" that is "well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.""
Many lower courts have still not got the message. Judges have been so offended
by the reinstatement of deviant postal workers, sexual harassers, and alcoholic airline
pilots that they have disregarded the directives of Enterprise and Misco.6
Unfortunately and unaccountably, the Supreme Court has not seen fit to step in and
insist that its dictates be followed.69 Thus, the First7 ° and Fifth7' Circuits have taken
64. Id. at 32-35.
65. Id. at 38.
66. Id. at 42.
67. Id. at 43 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United
Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (emphasis in the original) (quoting Muschany v.
United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945))).
68. See infra notes 70-71, 78-81.
69. A lawyer who successfully argued the Steelworkers Trilogy, has ruefully suggested that
less deference may now be paid to the awards in labor arbitration than in commercial
arbitration. David E. Feller, Presidential Address: Bye Bye Trilogy, Hello Arbitration, in
ARBITRATION 1993: ARBITRATIONAND THE CHANGING WORLD OFWORK, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE
FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 9-13 (Gladys W.
Gruenberg ed., 1994).
70. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, 118 F.3d 841,844, 852 (1 st Cir. 1997)
(reversing district court's decision to uphold an arbitral award for the reinstatement of a driver
of a petroleum truck who had tested positive for cocaine); United States Postal Serv. v. Am.
Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 823 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's decision
to set aside arbitral award reinstating postal worker who had embezzled $4325 worth of money
orders).
71. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850 (5th
Cir. 1996) (reversing arbitrator's award of reinstatement or back pay to a chemical plant
supervisor who had tested positive for cocaine); cf. Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Marine
Engineers Dist. 2,889 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating arbitrator had exceeded his contractual
authority in reinstating grossly careless riverboat captain who had nearly collided with barges).
But cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 175 F.3d 355 (5th Cir.
1999) (enforcing award for reinstatement of railroad employee who had tested positive for
drugs); United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 193 F.3d 328
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it upon themselves to find an award at odds with their notions of public policy, even
though the action ordered, such as a reinstatement, would not have violated any
positive law or established public policy if it had been taken by the employer on its
own initiative. The Fourth,' Sixth, 3 Seventh,7 4 Ninth,7 5 Tenth7 6 and District of
Columbia' Circuits have been far more faithful to the Misco mandate. They have
enforced awards reinstating grievants which, in effect, did not sustain or order
conduct that would have been forbidden to the employer acting unilaterally. The
Second,7 Third," Eighth,"0 and Eleventh8' Circuits have vacillated on the issue, but
(5th Cir. 1999) (upholding award requiring deduction of union dues from rehired employee
who had not signed a new checkoff form authorizing deductions).
72. See, e.g., Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 171 F.3d 971, 976-78
(4th Cir. 1999) (upholding award requiring reinstatement of employee who had harassed
coworker).
73. See, e.g., TVA v. Tenn. Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 519-21 (6th
Cir. 1999) (upholding arbitrator's award for reinstatement of nuclear reactor unit operator who
tested positive for marijuana); MidMichigan Reg'l Med. Center-Clare v. Prof 1 Employees
Div. of Local 79, 183 F.3d 497, 504-06 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding arbitrator's award for
reinstatement of a nurse who negligently handled equipment during cardiac emergency);
Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. UAW, 981 F.2d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding arbitrator's
award of reinstatement for installer of automobile test equipment who violated company drug
policy), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 931 (1993).
74. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Indus. Union, 959 F.2d 685, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1992)
(upholding arbitrator's award for reinstatement of male forklift operator who had sexually
harassed female coworker by grabbing her breasts), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992).
75. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local 588 v. Foster Poultry
Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 174-75 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding arbitrator's award for reinstatement of
employees who had failed drug test, and rescinding employer's drug testing program pending
bargaining with union despite state regulation mandating random drug testing); Stead Motors
of Walnut Creek v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1202, 1209-17
(9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (upholding arbitrator's award for reinstatement of auto mechanic who
had repeatedly failed to tighten lug nuts on car wheels; court would vacate award on public
policy grounds only if policy "specifically militates against the relief ordered by the
arbitrator"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988). But cf. Garveyv. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580,590-
92 (9th Cir. 2000) (vacating denial of baseball player's collusion claim because arbitrator's
finding "is completely inexplicable and borders on the irrational" and because arbitrator
dispensed "his own brand of industrial justice").
76. See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 1205-08 (10th Cir.
1999) (upholding arbitrator's award for reinstatement of employee who had tested positive for
marijuana following accident); Communications Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882
F.2d467, 468(10th Cir. 1989) (upholding arbitrator's award for reinstatement ofelectric utility
lineman who in isolated incident sexually harassed customer in her home).
77. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 77-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (upholding arbitrator's award for conditional reinstatement ofalcoholic airline pilot
who had flown while intoxicated).
78. CompareLocal97,IBEWv.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp., 196F.3d 117,119-21 (2d
Cir. 1999) (upholding arbitrator's reinstatement of nuclear plant security officer who had failed
to respond to fire alarm and then lied repeatedly during investigation), and Local 97, IBEW
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 143 F.3d 704, 706 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding arbitrator's
reinstatement of nuclear plant technician who had supplied adulterated urine sample in drug
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Ind. L.J. 95 2001
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the most recent decisions seem more in line with Misco.
Because I consider it one of the easier issues in arbitration, however much
misunderstood by a number of courts, I shall deal brusquely with the rejection of
otherwise legitimate awards on the basis of a nebulous public policy. That usually
comes down to the highly subjective feelings of particular judges. For me, three
estimable critics have correctly assessed the problem and arrived at the right solution.
In various formulations, Judge Frank Easterbrook 2 and Professors Charles Craver 3
and David Feller" have concluded that if the employer (or the employer in
conjunction with the union) has the lawful authority to take unilaterally the action
directed by the arbitrator, such as reinstatement of a wrongdoing employee, the
arbitral award should be upheld against pubic-policy claims. That approach is entirely
in keeping with the underlying notion that the arbitrator is the parties' surrogate, their
designated spokesperson in reading and applying the contract. What the parties are
entitled to say or do on their own, the arbitrator is entitled to say or order. That simple
principle seems so self-evident, and so implicit in the Supreme Court's rulings in
Enterprise and Misco, that it should become the accepted norm in the future. This
test and subsequently tested positive for cocaine), with Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island
Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1990) (setting aside arbitrator's
reinstatement of male employee who had harassed female coworkers), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
922 (1991). Cf Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating
that arbitral award rejecting claim under the ADEA may be vacated for "manifest disregard"
of law or evidence), cert. denied, 526 S. Ct. 1286 (1999).
79. Compare Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357,358 (3d Cir.
1993) (setting aside reinstatement of ship helmsman who tested positive for marijuana after oil
tanker had run aground), with United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 839
F.2d 146, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding reinstatement of postal worker who shot at
supervisor's empty, parked car).
80. Compare Homestake Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 7044, 153 F.3d 678,
679-80(8th Cir. 1998) (upholding reinstatement of mine welder who allegedly violated federal
safety regulations by not shielding welding so as to avoid fire hazard), with Iowa Elec. Light
& Power Co. v. Local Union 204, IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424, 1425-26 (8th Cir. 1987) (vacating
arbitor's decision to reinstate employee in nuclear power plant who defeated safety lock to take
short cut to lunch).
81. Compare Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665, 666-69, 675
(11 th Cir. 1988) (overturning reinstatement of alcoholic airline pilot who had been discharged
after flying while intoxicated), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989), and United States Postal
Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 776 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (setting aside
reinstatement of postal worker who stole mail), with Fla. Power Corp. v. IBEW, Local Union
433, 847 F.2d 680, 680-81 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (sustaining reinstatement of employee who was
in possession of cocaine while driving drunk).
82. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Arbitration, Contract, and Public Policy, in ARBITRATION
1991: THE CHANGING FACE OF ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
44TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 65, 70-77 (Gladys W.
Gruenberg ed., 1992); see also E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep.
Assoc., 790 F.2d 611, 618-20 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
83. See Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 CIH.-KENT L. REV. 571, 604-05 (1990).
84. See David E. Feller, Court Review ofArbitration, 43 LAB. L.J. 539, 543 (1992).
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would merely confrm arbitration as the "final and binding" dispute resolution
procedure that the parties' contracts almost invariably denominate.
We may shortly have further enlightenment from the Supreme Court on this long-
running debate. In March 2000, certiorari was granted in Eastern Associated Coal
Corp. v. UnitedMine Workers, District 17."5 This was another instance of marijuana
ingestion by a worker in a hazardous occupation, here, a mobile equipment operator.
In sustaining the arbitrator's reinstatement of the employee, both the trial and
appellate courts acknowledged that Department of Transportation regulations
expressed a "well defined and dominant public policy" against drugs on thejob.86 But
the court of appeals got it exactly right when it went on to say: "[A]lthough there is
a public policy against the use of illegal drugs by those in safety-sensitive positions,
there is no such public policy against the reinstatement of employees who have used
illegal drugs in the past."87
In short, the key is whether the remedial action ordered by the arbitrator, not the
triggering conduct of the employee, is contrary to public policy. Of course the drug-
taking employee acted contrary to public policy. But the award-issuing arbitrator did
not and his decision should stand. Indeed, recognizing the possibility of the
rehabilitation of wrongdoers is a hallmark of a humane and caring society.8" Despite
the ominous implications of a grant of certiorari when the court of appeals did not
even deign to publish its opinion, the Supreme Court should recognize the distinction
and rule accordingly.
III. ARBITRATION OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS
The greatest potential for the expansion of arbitration lies in the nonunion sector.
The United States remains the only major industrial democracy in the world which
persists in the pernicious doctrine of employment at will. 9 As stated in its purest form
in a famous nineteenth century court decision, the doctrine means employers may
"dismiss their employees at will... for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
85. 120 S. Ct. 1416 (2000). For the case below, see E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United
Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 66 F. Supp. 2d 796 (S.D. W. Va. 1998), aff'd per curiam, No. 98-
2527, 1999 WL 635632 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1999).
86. E. Associated Coal Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
87. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, No. 98-2527, 1999 WL
635632, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1997) (unpublished opinion).
88. The classic treatment in the penal context is FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 80-89 (1981).
89. See supra note 9; see also Comm. on Labor & Emp., The Ass'n ofthe Bar of the City
of New York, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 RECORD 170, 175
(1981). About sixty nations now prohibit discharge without cause, including the European
Union, Japan, Canada, and others in South America, Africa, and Asia. Id. at 175; see also
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT DIGEST 384-87
(Malcolm Crotty etal. eds., 2000); Americo Pla Rodriquez, Termination ofEmployment on the
Initiative of the Employer, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 221, 221 (1982). The International Labour
Organization went on record two decades ago against unjust dismissal. Convention (No. 158)
Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, June 22, 1982, 1412
U.N.T.S. 159.
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morally wrong."'9
The first breach in the wall occurred when the California courts could no longer
stomach such outrageous employer behavior as the firing of employees for refusing
to commit perjury at the employer's behest' or for refusing to participate in an illegal
price-fixing scheme.' Since then, mostly during the last twenty years, courts in about
forty-five jurisdictions have used a variety of tort or contract theories to ameliorate
some of the harshest rigors of employment at will.9" The concepts relied on have
included public policy, usually as embodied in state statutes or constitutions;"
express or implied contract based on personnel manuals or oral assurances at the time
of hiring;95 and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.96
Welcome as they are as a first step in the right direction, judicial modifications of
at-will employment suffer from several deficiencies. From the employee's
perspective, they do not go far enough. The tort theory generally requires an
unconscionable violation of a well-established public policy, and that is relatively
rare.97 The contract theory will be unavailable if an employer refrains from any oral
or written promises of job security,98 or rescinds a prior commitment by adequate
notice to the workforce." Only a handful of states accept the most expansive theory,
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Lastly, even if an employee has a
cognizable legal claim, few rank-and-file workers will have enough money at stake
to make it worth the while of a lawyer handling cases on a contingent fee.' °"
When the common law exceptions to at-will employment do apply, however, they
can be devastating to unlucky employers. Juries can succumb to emotional appeals,
90. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
91. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
92. Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
93. See Employee at WillState Rulings Chart, 9A [Individual Emp. Rts. Manual] Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 505:51 (1999).
94. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Palmateer v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d
834,840 (Wis. 1983). But see Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86,89-90 (N.Y.
1983).
95. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884-85 (Mich. 1980);
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441,445 (N.Y. 1982); cf Cotran v. Rollins Hudig
Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412,414 (Cal. 1998) (concluding that employer's reasonable grounds,
not employee's actual conduct, are the test).
96. See Foleyv. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,383-87 (Cal. 1988); Fortune v. Nat'l
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977).
97. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453,460-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding
employment at will because of disclaimer in employment application).
99. See, e.g., Bankeyv. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Mich. 1989); cf. Enis v.
Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d 39,41 (7th Cir. 1986) (opining that an employee
manual only creates contract rights if it is part of a preexisting contract or a modification of an
employment-at-will relationship).
100. See Employment at Will State Rulings Chart, 9A [Individual Emp. Rts. Manual] Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-505:52 (1999).
101. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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and they have awarded individual employees $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million,
$2.75 million, $2 million, $1.5 million, $1.19 million, and $1 million." Studies of
California cases found that a plaintiff who could reach a jury won almost ninety
percent of the time. 3 Leading management lawyers inform me that even a successful
defense in a jury trial may cost $100,000 to $200,000. On balance, the present
common-law system ill serves all parties, except perhaps the plaintiffs' bar.
Ultimately, I believe, legislation must provide the solution.
To date Montana is the only state that has enacted a statutory "good cause"
requirement for the dismissal of covered employees."'° In 1991, however, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("ULC") adopted the
Model Employment Termination Act ("META") by a vote of thirty-nine to
eleven of the state delegations. 0 5 META protects most full-time, nonprobationary
employees-those working twenty or more hours a week after one year of
service-against discharge without good cause." The term "good cause" was chosen
rather than the "just cause" customary in collective bargaining agreements to
emphasize the discretion allowed management in economic decisions. 0 7 Good cause
may consist of either misconduct or poor performance on an employee's part, or the
employer's good faith business judgment that a particular employee is no longer
needed or suitable for the job."°
Unjust dismissalremains a significant problemin our society. A careful scholarhas
estimated that about 2 million of the 60 million at-will employees in the United States
are discharged each year and that about 150,000 of these would have valid claims.if
they had the same protections afforded most unionized workers.
META aims at a fair and practical compromise between the competing worthy
interests of employers and employees. Employers are entitled to maintain efficient
and productive enterprises Employees are entitled to be free from arbitrary treatment
in the workplace. When rights are contested in legal pro ceedings, both employers and
employees are entitled to procedures that are simple and readily accessible, swift and
102. Kenneth Lopatka & Julia Martin, Developments in the Law of WrongfulDischarge, in
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND INVASION OF PRIVACY
CLAIMS vii, 13-18 (1986); see also JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION (1988).
103. CliffPalefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood" and Goliath, 62 MICH.
B.J. 776, 776 (1983).
104. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1999); see also Marcy v. Delta Airlines,
166 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1999) (2-1 decision) (holding that, under Montana statute,
employer's good faith is no defense if employee was discharged under mistaken view of facts).
Puerto Rico has enacted similar legislation. 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 185 (1985).
105. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 428 (1991). See generally
Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH.
L. REv. 361 (1994). I should note that I served as Reporter, or principal draftsperson, for
META. The views stated here, however, are entirely my own.
106. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 433.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 1(4), 7A U.L.A. 429.
109. Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558
(1985).
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Ind. L.J. 99 2001
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
not overly expensive. And while employees would receive broadened substantive
rights under META, 0 and the remedy of reinstatement to their jobs along with back
pay,"' employers would be relieved of the risk of crushing punitive damages."'
The preferred method for enforcing META is through professional arbitrators
appointed by an appropriate state agency. The rationale is that arbitrators' experience
and familiarity with the workplace should make them acceptable to both employers
and employees, and their experience in handling labor disputes should produce
shorter and less expensive hearings."' The use of ad hoc arbitrators would also avoid
the need to create a new permanent staff of hearing officers in state labor agencies.
Adoption of META or an equivalent throughout the country would have a
galvanizing effect on arbitration. In the mid-1990s, union density in private
employment was down to around ten percent, but there were still some 25,000 labor
arbitration awards a year, of which about forty percent, or 10,000, were in discipline
cases." 4 Even if good cause for dismissal became a national standard, and arbitration
the principal forum, I would not expect a tenfold increase in the caseload. Yet a rise
in awards in discharge" 5 cases to at least 30,000 a year in the private sector would
seem a reasonable expectation.
None of this is going to happen any time soon. Shortly after the ULC adopted
META in 1991, it (or bills based at least in part on it) received a flurry of attention
in about a dozen states.'6 Nine years after the ULC endorsement, however, no state
besides Montana has passed good cause legislation. In addition to the increasingly
conservative atmosphere in state houses across the nation, there has been a lack of
support from organized interest groups. Representatives of the AFL-CIO and the
American Civil Liberties Union were the only spokespersons for major organizations
to urge in writing that the ULC approve a model act in 1991." Even so, union
lobbyists with other priorities have shown no enthusiasm for the bills introduced in
various legislatures. Management representatives have commended META as a fair
compromise in private comments. But it seems a quite different matter to go public
110. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 429,433 (requiring an assault,
drug use, absenteeism, insubordination, substandard work, etc., on the part of a covered
employee, or an honest business judgment by the employer concerning the size or nature of the
workforce, to justify a dismissal).
111. Id. § 7(b), 7A U.L.A. 440.
112. Id. § 7(d), 7A U.L.A. 440.
113. Id. at app., 7A U.L.A. 448.
114. I have done some very rough extrapolations from the data ofDennis R. Nolan & Roger
I. Abrams, Trends in Private Sector Grievance Arbitration, in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER
FIRE 42, 59, 66-69 (James L. Stem & Joyce M. Najita eds., 1997). Among my quite fallible
assumptions was the notion that the proportion of private-sector arbitrations would
approximate the proportion of private-sector to public-sector union membership. Furthermore,
figures on discipline cases include suspensions as well as discharges.
115. META deals only with discharge or constructive discharge, not lesser discipline.
Common-law court decisions have been almost universally the same.
116. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, NewHampshire,
and Oklahoma, with further variants in New York and Pennsylvania. My principal sources were
ULC headquarters in Chicago and Professor Stuart Henry of Eastern Michigan University.
117. See St. Antoine, supra note 105, at 380-81.
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in favor of still another diminution of the employer's once sovereign prerogative to
rule the workplace.
Plaintiffs' attorneys are META's most outspoken opponents."' Some are
undoubtedly sincere in believing that it is wrong for employees to be denied jury
trials and the possibility of full compensatory and punitive damages." 9 Others, I fear,
may simply oppose the loss of the hefty contingent fees they can now collect from
successful upper-middle-class clients.
I would feel much more pessimistic about the prospects of ever getting good cause
legislation in this country if it were not for my experience with the ULC. The initial
reaction was considerable skepticism along with some outright hostility. 0 Yet after
three years of searching debate and extensive revision of the proposal, this
experienced body of mainstream lawyers, judges, and legislators became convinced
of the essential fairness and soundness of the model act. The final vote was an
overwhelming thirty-nine to eleven approval. '1 In addition, the current proliferation
of actions grounded in civil rights statutes, either before courts or arbitrators, may
lead in fact to an increasing emphasis upon the need for good cause to justify an
employee's dismissal. As a practical matter, the best defense for any employer or
union accused of some type of categorical discrimination (for example, based on race,
sex, age, disability, etc.) is to demonstrate that there was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken. 1
22
CONCLUSION
The grievance and arbitration system is probably collective bargaining's greatest
contribution to the American working person-even more important than economic
benefits." Arbitrators have played a key role in advancing that system by being the
final arbiters in most of the contract disputes that cannot be settled voluntarily by
unions and management. In so doing they have promoted the interests of employers
118. See Paul Tobias, Defects in the ModelEmployment Termination Act, 43 LAB. L.J. 501,
503 & n.8 (1992).
119. Id. at 500-01, 503.
120. See St. Antoine, supra note 105, at 369. At its first reading before the ULC, META had
to survive a motion to discharge the drafting committee on the grounds the whole project was
a futile exercise.
121. Supra text accompanying note 105.
122. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254-55 (1981) (gender
discrimination); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (race
discrimination); cf. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (race
discrimination). If unions were more imaginative, another indirect effect of existing civil rights
legislation might be its use as an organizing device, through a willingness on the part of labor
organizations to represent nonunion employees with discrimination claims against employers.
The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees has informed me of some
success with such tactics in public employment.
123. See DEREK C. BOK& JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABORAND THE AMERICAN CoMMuNITY 219-
21,463-65 (1970); ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICs OFTRADE UNIONS 74, 89-90, 186-87 (2d
ed. rev. 1977); LLOYD G. REYNOLDS ET AL, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 257-
60, 541-62 (10th ed. 1991); SUMNER H. SLICHTER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 954-61 (1960).
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in uninterrupted production as well as those of employees in fair and equitable
treatment.
In the halcyon days following the Second World War, labor arbitrators operated in
a largely self-contained domain where the collective bargaining agreement reigned
almost supreme. External civil law in the form of statutes and common-law court
decisions seldom intruded. Then, .as a spate of civil rights statutes and other laws
aimed at protecting individual employee rights in the workplace poured forth in the
1960s and 1970s, arbitrators construing labor contracts were drawn ineluctably into
the interpretation and application of this overlapping legislation. That in turn led to
heightened judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards in both union and nonunion contexts.
Employers dreading the costs of litigating employees' statutory claims in court
increasingly sought to channel such actions into arbitration, under both collective
bargaining agreements and individual contracts. A major remaining issue is the extent
to which unions and individuals may waive employee rights to pursue statutory claims
in the courts, requiring submission to arbitration instead. The problem is especially
acute in so-called mandatory arbitration, where the employer makes the agreement to
arbitrate a condition of employment. On the face of it, such agreements would seem
contrary to sound public policy. But there are pragmatic grounds for thinking rank-
and-file workers may actually benefit from these arrangements. They may be able to
go to arbitration when they could not afford a lawy&r to bring a court action. And they
may even fare better before an arbitrator than before a judge.
Not surprisingly, increased judicial review of awards dealing with statutes whetted
many courts' appetites for going further and taking a closer look at the area
previously left mostly to itself-awards concerning collective agreements. At least
that was true of those awards which in the courts' eyes might be seen to contravene
some sort of "public policy." On the few occasions when the Supreme Court has
intervened, it has invariably exercised a restraining influence; judges are not to apply
their own personal yardsticks of public interest in determining whether or not to
enforce a particular award.
-The last major development in the arbitration landscape, which holds out so much
promise and which yet to date has borne so little fruit, is the use of arbitration to
implement the right of employees not to be discharged without good and sufficient
cause. I have speculated that if and when dismissal for cause becomes the standard
in this country-as it is in every other major industrial democracy-the arbitration
caseload for discharge cases might well quadruple or better. That would be a great
boon for the profession of labor arbitration. Far more important, a good cause
requirement would mark the most significant advance for employee rights in the
United States since the passage of the Wagner Act.24
124. Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1994)).
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